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Abstract: 
The air transport industry is an essential part of our modern economy, playing a vital role in supporting international trade, economic integration, and long-term economic growth. This chapter reviews the topics in the field of airline economics, including areas such as airline demand, airline cost and production, airline competition and airline pricing. Both theories and practices in these topics are discussed from an economic perspective. The impact of new technology on airline competition and pricing is also explored.











The model of supply and demand explains how prices are determined in a market system. It is important for an airline to understand the market demand and the supply for its own product in order to make informed strategic and operational decisions. The demand for an airline’s services is influenced by the price it charges, the prices charged by its competitors, the availability of other transport modes, its service quality such as frequency, and in-flight services, its safety record, passengers’ income and preferences, macroeconomic conditions and demand shocks (Vasign et al., 2018). A change in one or more of these factors (except its own price) will shift the demand curve and lead to a new equilibrium price. In the following, some of these factors will be briefly discussed.
First, the demand for air transport is highly responsive to price. Most passengers, even some of the business travelers, are sensitive to airfares Zhang (2012). More and more companies have issued the travel policies to control business travel expenses.  Previous demand estimations for the developed economies show that the values of air travel price elasticities range from -0.8 to -2.0. In general, it is found that the price elasticity values are from 0.2 to -3.2, with the majority varying between -1.0 and -2.0 (Oum et al., 1993). A recent study on the China and India aviation markets finds that the demand elasticity is about -2.6 in India while is about -1.2 for China (Wang et al., 2018). This suggests that the major Indian routes have a very price-elastic demand compared with other aviation markets in the world. 
Income is one of the determinants of the demand for air services, which is usually proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Air service is a normal good and thus the higher income, the higher air travel demand. Studies have shown that demand elasticity with respect to income is around 2: for instance, if the economy grows by 5 per cent, then the air travel demand would grow by 10 per cent; likewise, if the economy contracts by 2 per cent, the demand would shrink by 4 per cent. This pro-cyclical behavior has important implications for airlines’ decisions on route entry and exit, and on aircraft order, purchase and lease (Zhang and Zhang, 2018). 
In addition to price and income, air travel demand is affected by the availability of other modes of transport. Since the new century, high-speed rail (HSR) has emerged as a significant transport mode in Europe and China after its success in Japan for several decades (Zhu et al., 2019). The high-speed rail (HSR) service has been shown to be a good substitute for air on short/medium-haul routes, sometimes even on long-haul routes.  Here, the modal choice is based on the full opportunity cost, i.e., the sum of ticket price and journey time cost. The total journal time consists of access time, travel time, and expected “schedule delay” (Behrens and Pels, 2012)  For a given origin-destination (O-D) pair, while air mode has a shorter travel time than HSR, it has longer access time including the time of accessing to (and egressing from) the airport/train station, the time spent at the terminals, and the takeoff/landing time (Zhang and Zhang, 2018). Higher frequency will reduce the cost of schedule delay, a measure depicting the deviations from a passenger’s preferred time of travel, and increase the visibility of a flight option (Douglas and Miller, 1974). More frequent services reduce expected schedule delays and hence is a more convenient service, which in turn increases demand. 
Demand for air travel is also related to distance. The longer the travel distance involved, the fewer trips will be made. This is sometimes referred to as the gravity of law of travel demand: demand falls with the square of the distance between origin and destination, similar to the gravity law in physics. Much of the airline literature on O-D bilateral air traffic flows employs a gravity model. However, unlike the gravity models in the international-trade literature where the distance variable is consistently statistically significant, distance does not seem to be a good proxy for bilateral cost after airline deregulation (or liberalization) that first started in the US in 1978 and then spread to other countries, especially in the markets where low-cost carriers (LCCs) are present (Zhang et al., 2018a). The average airfares have been declining in the last 30 years as a result of strong competition in the airline industry. Discounted airfares are prevalent on short-distance and particularly on long-distance routes. Therefore, geographical distance is no longer a good proxy for travel cost. That distance plays a smaller role in air transport may also be due to other reasons. First, on short-distance routes (say, less than 300-400 km) few air trips are made, owing to an increased cost/time ratio relative to alternative modes such as HSR or automobiles. Second, very long distance eliminates alternative transport modes (such as HSR and cars), which may increase the demand for air services (Zhang and Zhang, 2018).
Overall aviation safety across the world has steadily improved over the last three decades. However, in 2018 there were 15 crashes causing 556 fatalities, compared with 44 deaths in 10 accidents in 2017. Safety and security are top priorities in airline management since both are important determinants for air travel demand. Air travel drops whenever there is a major air disaster, and so there has long been a major emphasis on safety and security regulation in aviation. Safety regulation involves policies and procedures to minimize the risks of failures in the design and operation of airlines and airports. Security concerns deliberate sabotage or other acts to cause harm to air operations and the travelling public. Since September 11, 2001, security has become the highest priority of the global aviation industry and many governments. However, increases in safety and security can only be justified when the benefits are greater than the costs. The full benefits are difficult to quantify in reality and research into the economics of safety and security is still rare in the airline literature (Vasigh, et al., 2018).
2. Airline costs and production
While consumers form one side of the market – the demand side, airlines form the supply side. As with other industries, to provide air transportation services airlines use various inputs, such as labor, capital, fuel, and materials. Therefore, the main determinants of the supply of air services include ticket price, the prices of inputs such fuel and labor, airport charges, aircraft costs, maintenance costs, government regulations and technology (Vasigh et al., 2018). Random factors such as weather and strikes also affect the provision of air services.
Fuel cost is the largest cost component for most airlines, which accounts for around 20-50 per cent of the total costs depending on the type of airlines and time (Koopmans and Lieshout, 2016). A flight sector comprises the ascent and decent phases as well as the cruise phase. During the cruise, the fuel cost is proportional to the route distance. Fuel costs can also differ substantially from one country to another, due mainly to the differences in taxes and transport costs. Airlines pay fuel prices at airports they serve, and thus the average price paid by a carrier is roughly a weighted average of fuel prices of the destinations it serves. Although the fuel price is largely out of an airline’s control, some airlines are keen to use more fuel-efficient aircraft to save costs by purchasing (or leasing) new planes. Other airlines choose to replace the seats, television monitors, and even the beverage carts with newer and lighter versions (FAA, 2011). Aviation fuel is a major contributor to emissions. Interestingly, in the EU, aviation fuel has long been tax exempt and aviation fuel tax has been called for to help Europe to meet its climate targets. 
As fuel cost has replaced labor cost as the largest cost component for many airlines, fuel hedging has been frequently used to reduce airline exposure to unexpected changes in fuel price. This is because these days it it difficult for airlines to pass the rise in fuel cost on to consumers in a deregulated and competitive operating environment. Interestingly, however, the benefit of fuel hedging appears controversial. Some studies report a positive impact of fuel hedging on the airlines’ firm value (Sturm, 2009), while some other studies claim that hedging does not necessarily affect a firm’s market value (Jin and Jorion, 2004), and that sometimes it could have a negative but insignificant impact on operating costs (Lim and Hong, 2014). This means that the actual benefit of fuel heading could be negligible. Therefore, it seem that merely engaging in fuel hedging is not sufficient to achieve cost reduction. 
In the last two decades, the legacy airlines have managed to reduce their labor costs through various ways. Declaring bankruptcy is one way through which the contract conditions can be changed and the benefits and pensions can be reduced. American Airlines, Delta, Northwest, United, US Airways and Continental all used this way to reduce the labor costs. Some of them went through bankruptcy twice. Qantas suffered huge financial losses from 2011 to 2014 and it announced to cut 5,000 jobs, 15% of its workforce in 2014 as well as other cost control measures. In 2015, Qantas returned to profits. It should be noted that LCCs do not necessarily pay lower wages than full services carriers do, but they may require staff to perform multiple tasks to save costs. 
Airlines operate in a dynamic environment with a great number of uncertainties, and with airline revenues and costs being influenced heavily by overall economic activities. An important financial decision is the decision to buy or lease aircraft. Operating lease and direct purchase with bank finance are two commonly used methods of financing the aircraft acquisition. Should an airline purchase and own the aircraft? If purchased, should the airline pay 100 per cent cash or borrow some funds for the purchase? These decisions depend on the market conditions and the airline’s financial conditions (Accession Capital Corp, 2003). There is no one method that is superior to another. Interest rates, discount rates, lease rates and depreciation are relevant costs and should be taken into account when making these decision (Zhang and Zhang, 2018). Today, around 40% of the worldwide fleet is owned by leasing companies. The share of leased aircraft was only 20% in 2000 and is expected to reach 50% in 2020.
It is believed that airline cost per seat declines with the size of aircraft (up to some threshold). Furthermore, the cost per passenger falls as the percent of seats sold on a flight (the “load factor”) rises, since much of a flight’s cost is fixed regardless of the number of passengers flown (Zhang and Zhang, 2018). These relationships do not necessarily imply the existence of economies of scale in airline operations, however. In fact, some researchers claim that economies of scale are negligible or non-existent (White, 1979). This is because adding or dropping cities from an airline’s network does not raise or lower unit cost. In contrast, sizeable economies of traffic density seem to exist up to fairly large volumes of traffic (Caves et al., 1984). This means that the airline industry is more likely to exhibit economies of density instead of economies of scale, and that the cost savings can be achieved through the intensive and efficient use of larger aircraft with higher load factors (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994).  
3. Airline pricing  
For most airline markets, there are only a few airlines competing against each other. Therefore, airline markets are typically oligopolistic (Levine, 1987; Borenstein, 1992). Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to examine the patterns of airline pricing, entry and price dispersion (e.g., Borenstein, 1985; Brueckner and Spiller, 1991; Berry, 1992; Brander and Zhang, 1990, 1993). Many of the studies have found that mode of rivalry, price discrimination, new technology and innovation, the presence of LCCs, market structure, deregulation and airline merger and alliance are key determinants of the variations in airline pricing (Zhang et al., 2018b). 
Price discrimination is traditionally seen as one of the sources of price variation, especially in the airline industry (Cross, 1995; McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). There are three types of price discrimination: first degree, second degree and third degree. Under first-degree price discrimination, the entire consumer surplus is transferred to the firms, which is unlikely in reality, as airlines do not usually have the ability to determine a consumer’s reservation price. Second-degree price discrimination is the practices of charging consumers difference prices for different quantities of the same product consumed. Probably a frequent flyer program may fall within this type of price discrimination as the points awarded to the passengers can be used later, which is a special kind of discount and consumers do not need to pay for the points at the time of purchasing the ticket. Third-degree price discrimination refers to the charge of difference prices to different consumer groups such as male and female, children and adults. Many airline offer corporate travel programs to companies and give cheaper contract prices, which is a practice of third-degree price discrimination. 
The emergence of new technology has enhanced price discrimination. Some researchers argue that airline pricing falls somewhere between first and second-degree price discrimination because of the use of computer reservation system (CRS), later renamed as Global Distribution System (GDS) (e.g., Kons, 1999).This is because the creation of a large number of prices possible by the GDS allows the airlines to acquire more consumer surplus than second-degree discrimination offers. The GDS provides virtual real-time connectivity between thousands of suppliers of travel inventory (e.g., airlines, hotels, car rental, and tour operators) and hundreds of thousands of retail sellers of travel products (Sismanidou et al., 2009). The system has significantly improved airlines efficiency in attracting and retaining customers and driving sales through travel agents. American Airlines was a pioneer in using a sophisticated yield management program to attract both the high yield and low yield passengers in the 1980s, which gave it huge competitive advantage in the battle against the newly established carriers such as People Express Airlines following airline deregulation (Smith et al., 1992). For example, the carrier used “Ultimate Super Saver” fares to match People Express’s lowest prices (Vasigh et al., 2018). This price type required 21-day advance purchase restrictions in order to draw in only the most price-sensitive travelers. The airline also controlled the number of “Ultimate Super Saver” fares available on each flight in order to make seats available to high-yield passengers (Cross, 1995. By this way, the airline was able to generate profit from both low-revenue and high-revenue passengers. In contract, People Express could only capture low-revenue passengers with its single fare class reservations system. 
In the 1990s, airlines began to reduce the commission paid to travel agencies and the distribution system by increasing their direct sales through the Internet. The Internet enables airline products accessible 24/7 and allows the airlines, the distributors and the customers to communicate and interact with each other globally and efficiently (e.g., Timmers, 2000). In particular, LCCs took advantage of the Internet to developed simple distribution strategies and bypass travel agents and GDSs, which is a key factor for the success of this business model. For example, JetBlue and Southwest Airlines sell up to 90% of their tickets directly through their websites. China’s Spring Airlines has tried many ways to save costs, including the use of its own CRS and encouraging online purchases. The internet is now its main channel of distribution and passengers who purchase tickets through a ticketing office have to pay an extra pruchase fee. Its average ticket price was about 30% lower than the industry average price. With the advantage of low price ticket, Spring Airlines maintained a high load factor of about 95% through offering low airfares, well above the industry average of 70% (Zhang and Lu, 2013).
The recent advance in new technologies of the artificial intelligence, big data and virtual reality can lead to a revolution in airline pricing and personalization concepts (Krämer et al., 2018). Dynamic pricing as a result of the capability of analyzing big data allows airlines to predict with a high degree of certainty customer demand and preferences, which makes it possible for the airlines to offer a fare that is closer to the customers’ demand (Hammou et al., 2018). Based on the customers’ browsing pattern, the artificial intelligence system tracks the changing volume of search requests from the airline website or other search engines. The airlines can make prompt changes to the airfare if needed. 
Airline pricing is also accociated with market concentation. An increase in concentration (e.g., as a result of airline mergers and alliances) may confer the airlines with market power. Following airline deregulation there was a wave of airline mergers in the 1980s that were supported by the Reagan administration. In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of airline alliances, both international and domestic. Today there are three major global alliance groups – namely, Star Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam – make up over 60 per cent of the world market in recent years. There are many reasons for airlines merge and form strategic alliances, including expansion of seamless service networks, traffic feeding between partners, cost efficiency (based mainly on economies of traffic density), quality improvement, various marketing advantages (e.g. frequent flyer programs, or FFP), and the advantage of market power and cooperative pricing (Oum et al., 2000). Although in many countries where antitrust laws and active enforcement have made mergers and alliances as an instrument for market power difficult, we cannot exclude market power motive as one of the important reasons pursued by airlines through airline mergers and alliances. Similarly, with the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system following deregulation in the US, the price charged by the hub airports has been a much debated topic, known as the “hub premium” debate (Lee and Luengo-prado, 2005). It has been found that airline yields at concentrated hubs are substantially higher than those non-hub airports, and that the dominant airlines’ yields at the concentrated airports are even higher. This implies that on the one hand, cost savings and better service could be generated by the hub-and-spoke system. On the other hand, with the ability to block entry because of a dominant presence, routes associated with hub endpoint(s) are believed to have higher fares than otherwise would be the case.
In most textbooks, market power is defined as the ability of a firm or group of firms persistently to hold price above the competitive level in a profitable way without losing so many sales that the price level is unstainable (Motta, 2004). However, significant market power does not seem to exist in the airline market since deregulation that relaxed market entry and exit. It is a common hypothesis that the ease or difficulty of entry into an industry has a significant impact on airline pricing. The easier entry is into an industry, the more difficult it will be for collusion to be sustained, because high prices and profits will attract new firms and break the collusion. Thus entry plays a very important role in competition analysis (Shepherd, 1997). 
In the airline industry, product differentiation helps incumbents lock up some consumers by establishing a reputation through their past performance, brand names and advertising, making it difficult for new entrants to attract customers (Shepherd, 1997). In this sense, product differentiation has endogenously become an entry-deterring strategy. Predatory pricing is another common pricing strategic entry barrier in the airline industry. Predatory pricing occurs when a price war is waged by incumbents against new or potential entrants. The incumbent first lowers its price to drive out the rivals and then raises it. By this means, it sacrifices a short-run loss to protect its long-run interest (Carlton and Perloff, 1999). 
In the 1980s, the contestable markets theory gained its popularity and many economists believe that the airlines market is contestable (Baumol et al., 1982). As airplanes can be easily shifted to other routes, entry into a market can be largely fully reversible. In addition, compared with its large fixed costs, the airline industry faces relatively low sunk costs along particular routes. Airline markets are therefore thought to be contestable. Once a market is contestable due to free entry and exit, potential competitors will become acceptable substitutes in consumers’ minds for the incumbent competitors. Whenever they see any above-normal profits in the market, potential entrants would enter and stay if they could earn sufficient revenue to cover their fixed and variable costs. Alternatively, potential entrants could follow a hit-and-run strategy, given the assumptions that they can identify consumers for their products at or below the current market price, and that existing firms are unable to change their prices quickly in response to their entry. Given such a potential threat, the incumbents’ pricing behaviour would be restrained by the potential entry and thereby a purely competitive outcome would result.
However, the strong assumptions associated with contestable market theory have been criticised by many economists. First, sunk costs associated with entry are most likely to exist in all markets to some extent (Spence, 1983). Even in the airline industry, for example, an airline must advertise to let passengers know before opening a new route (Stiglitz et al., 1987). Every airline market manager knows that it will take some time and effort before a new route becomes profitable. Therefore, in real life, perfectly contestable markets may not exist. Second, if the entry is on a small scale with no serious threat to the incumbents, incumbents do not necessarily change their market behaviour (Shepherd, 1984). They can continue to charge higher prices without losing much share of the market, or choose to accommodate the entrants. Accordingly, the contestable markets theory has gradually lost its popularity since the 1990s and market structure still plays an important role in determining an airline’s pricing.
Worldwide the LCCs have expanded rapidly and led to the declining in airfares (Zhang and Lu, 2013). The LCCs now carry about 30% of the total passengers. The threat of LCCs to the legacy airlines is obvious, and can be seen not only from the fall in hub premiums, but also from the response of the incumbents (most of which have established their own LCCs). The LCCs provide low fares, high frequency and point-to-point services. In the US, the negative effect of an LCC is present not only on the fares of the routes they are operating on, but also on the fares of adjacent competitive routes because of spillover effects (Morrison, 2001). In Australia, it has also been noticed by researchers that the emergence of LCCs not only had the apparent effect of lowing the price charged by the incumbent airlines, but also had profound effects on the incumbents’ performance, labour arrangements and costs and productivity, shifting towards a socially desirable direction (Forsyth, 2003). The “Southwest effect” or “Ryanair effect” is also felt in the Asian market. In India, the market share of LCCs have been above 60% for many years, which is a remarkable achievement that makes flying more affordable for low-income consumers (Wang et al., 2018). It has been widely agreed that the presence of LCCs represents an opportunity to develop the local economy by creating new employment and contributing to the local tourism.
4. Concluding remarks  
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